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Abstract
One of the most intriguing dynamics in biological systems is the emergence of clustering, in the sense that individuals self-
organize into separate agglomerations in physical or behavioral space. Several theories have been developed to explain
clustering in, for instance, multi-cellular organisms, ant colonies, bee hives, flocks of birds, schools of fish, and animal herds.
A persistent puzzle, however, is the clustering of opinions in human populations, particularly when opinions vary
continuously, such as the degree to which citizens are in favor of or against a vaccination program. Existing continuous
opinion formation models predict ‘‘monoculture’’ in the long run, unless subsets of the population are perfectly separated
from each other. Yet, social diversity is a robust empirical phenomenon, although perfect separation is hardly possible in an
increasingly connected world. Considering randomness has not overcome the theoretical shortcomings so far. Small
perturbations of individual opinions trigger social influence cascades that inevitably lead to monoculture, while larger noise
disrupts opinion clusters and results in rampant individualism without any social structure. Our solution to the puzzle builds
on recent empirical research, combining the integrative tendencies of social influence with the disintegrative effects of
individualization. A key element of the new computational model is an adaptive kind of noise. We conduct computer
simulation experiments demonstrating that with this kind of noise a third phase besides individualism and monoculture
becomes possible, characterized by the formation of metastable clusters with diversity between and consensus within
clusters. When clusters are small, individualization tendencies are too weak to prohibit a fusion of clusters. When clusters
grow too large, however, individualization increases in strength, which promotes their splitting. In summary, the new model
can explain cultural clustering in human societies. Strikingly, model predictions are not only robust to ‘‘noise’’—randomness
is actually the central mechanism that sustains pluralism and clustering.
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Introduction
Many biological systems exhibit collective patterns, which
emerge through simple interactions of large numbers of individ-
uals. A typical example is agglomeration phenomena. Such
clustering dynamics have been found in systems as different as
bacterial colonies [1], gregarious animals like cockroaches [2], fish
schools [3], flocks of birds [4], and animal groups [5]. Similar
phenomena are observed in ecosystems [6] and human popula-
tions, as examples ranging from the formation of pedestrian
groups [7] to the formation of urban agglomerations demonstrate
[8,9].
Recently, numerous studies on the structure of human
interaction networks [10–12] demonstrated that clustering is not
restricted to physical or geographical space. For instance,
clustering has been extensively studied in networks of email
communication [13], phone calls [12], scientific collaboration [14]
and sexual contacts [15]. It is much less understood, however, how
and what conditions clustering patterns emerge in behavioral or
opinion space. Empirical studies suggest that opinions differ
globally [16,17], while they cluster locally within geographical
regions [18], socio-demographic groups [19], or Internet commu-
nities [20]. In addition, research on dynamics in work teams
demonstrates that even groups of very small size often show high
opinion diversity and can even suffer from opinion polarization
[21,22].
Opinion clustering is defined as the co-existence of distinct
subgroups (clusters) of individuals with similar opinions, while
opinions in different subgroups are relatively large. The gaps in
our theoretical understanding of opinion clustering are pressing
since both local consensus and global diversity are precarious. On
the one hand, cultural diversity may get lost in a world where
people are increasingly exposed to influences from mass media,
Internet communication, interregional migration, and mass
tourism, which may promote a universal monoculture [23,24],
as the extinction of languages suggests [25]. On the other hand,
increasing individualization threatens to disintegrate the social
structures in which individuals are embedded, with the possible
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 1 October 2010 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e1000959consequence of the loss of societal consensus [26,27]. This is
illustrated by the recent debate on the decline of social capital
binding individuals into local communities [28].
Early formal models of social influence imply that monoculture
is unavoidable, unless a subset of the population is perfectly cut off
from outside influences [29]. Social isolation, however, appears
questionable as explanation of pluralism. In modern societies,
distances in social networks are quite short on the whole, and only
relatively few random links are required to dramatically reduce
network distance [10].
Aiming to explain pluralism, researchers have incorporated the
empirically well-supported observation of ‘‘homophily’’, i.e. the
tendency of ‘‘birds of a feather to flock together’’ [30,31], into
formal models of social influence [32]. These models typically
assume ‘‘bounded confidence’’ (BC) in the sense that only those
individuals interact, whose opinions do not differ more than a
given threshold level [33,34]. As Fig. 1A illustrates, BC generates
opinion clustering, a result that generalizes to model variants with
categorical rather than continuous opinions [32,35]. However,
clustering in the BC-model is sensitive to ‘‘interaction noise’’: A
small random chance that agents may interact even when their
opinions are not similar, causes monoculture again (see Fig. 1B).
To avoid this convergence of opinions, it was suggested that
individuals would separate themselves from negatively evaluated
others [19,36,37]. However, recent empirical results do not
support such ‘‘negative influence’’ [38]. Scientists also tried to
avoid convergence by ‘‘opinion noise’’, i.e. random influences,
which lead to arbitrary opinion changes with a small probability.
Assuming uniformly distributed opinion noise [39] leads to
sudden, large, and unmotivated opinion changes of individuals,
Author Summary
Modern societies are characterized by a large degree of
pluralism in social, political and cultural opinions. In addition,
there is evidence that humans tend to form distinct subgroups
(clusters), characterized by opinion consensus within the
clusters and differences between them. So far, however,
formal theories of social influence have difficulty explaining
this coexistence of global diversity and opinion clustering. In
this study, we identify a missing ingredient that helps to fill this
gap: the striving for uniqueness. Besides being influenced by
their social environment, individuals also show a desire to hold
a unique opinion. Thus, when too many other members of the
population hold a similar opinion, individuals tend to adopt an
opinion that distinguishes them from others. This notion is
rooted in classical sociological theory and is supported by
recent empirical research. We develop a computational model
of opinion dynamics in human populations and demonstrate
that the new model can explain opinion clustering. We
conduct simulation experiments to study the conditions of
clustering. Based on our results, we discuss preconditions for
the persistence of pluralistic societies in a globalizing world.
Figure 1. Opinion dynamics produced by the bounded confidence (BC) model [33] with and without noise. Populations consist of
N~100 agents. Opinions vary between 2250 and 250. Initial opinions are uniformly distributed. For visualization, the opinion scale is divided into 50
bins of equal size. Color coding indicates the relative frequency of agents in each bin. (A) Dynamics of the BC-model without noise [33] over 10
iterations (Each iteration consists of N simulation events t.). At each simulation event, one agent’s opinion is replaced by the average opinion of those
other agents who hold opinions oj(t) within the focal agent’s confidence interval (oi(t){Eƒoj(t)ƒoi(t)zE). For E~0:05, one finds several
homogeneous clusters, which stabilize when the distance between all clusters exceeds the confidence threshold E. (B) Computer simulation of the
same BC-model, but considering interaction noise. Agents that would otherwise not have been influential, now influence the focal agent’s opinion
with a probability of p~0:01. This small noise is sufficient to eventually generate monoculture. (C) Simulation of the BC-model with opinion noise.
After each opinion update, a random value drawn from a normal distribution with an average of zero and a standard deviation of h (abbreviated by
N(0,h)) is added to the opinion. For weak opinion noise (h~5), one cluster is formed, which carries out a random walk on the opinion scale. When the
opinion noise is significantly increased (h~18), there is still one big cluster, but many separated agents exist as well (cf. Fig. 4). With even stronger
opinion noise (h~20), the opinion distribution becomes completely random.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000959.g001
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studies of individualization [42,43] show a tendency of incremen-
tal opinion changes rather than arbitrary opinion jumps.
Incremental opinion changes, however, tend to promote mono-
culture, even in models with categorical rather than continuous
opinions [44]. Fig. 1 demonstrates that adding a ‘‘white noise’’
term (N(0,h)) to an agent’s current opinion in the BC model fails
to explain opinion clustering. Weak opinion noise (h~5) triggers
convergence cascades that inevitably end in monoculture.
Stronger noise restores opinion diversity, but not clustering.
Instead, diversity is based on frequent individual deviations from a
predominant opinion cluster (for h~18). However, additional
clusters cannot form and persist, because opinion noise needs to be
strong to separate enough agents from the majority cluster—so
strong that randomly emerging smaller clusters cannot stabilize.
In conclusion, the formation of persistent opinion clusters is
such a difficult puzzle that all attempts to explain them had to
make assumptions that are difficult to justify by empirical
evidence. The solution proposed in the following, in contrast,
aims to reconcile model assumptions with sociological and
psychological research. The key innovation is to integrate another
decisive feature into the model, namely the ‘‘striving for
uniqueness’’ [42,43]. While individuals are influenced by their
social environment, they also show a desire to increase their
uniqueness when too many other members of society hold similar
opinions. We incorporate this assumption as a white noise term in
the model. However, in contrast to existing models we assume that
noise strength is not constant but adaptive. To be precise, we
assume that the impact of noise on the opinion of an individual is
the stronger the less unique the individual’s opinion is compared to
the other members of the population. Consumer behavior
regarding fashions illustrates the adaptability of opinion noise:
When new clothing styles are adopted by some people, they often
tend to be imitated by others with similar spirit and taste (the ‘‘peer
group’’). However, when imitation turns the new style into a norm,
people will seek to increase their uniqueness. This will sooner or
later lead some individuals to invent new ways to dress differently
from the new norm.
Adaptive noise creates a dynamic interplay of the integrating and
disintegrating forces highlighted by Durkheim’s classic theory of
social integration [26]. Durkheim argued that integrating forces
bind individuals to society, motivating them to conform and adopt
values and norms that are similar to those of others. But he also saw
societal integration as being threatened by disintegrating forces that
foster individualization and drive actors to differentiate from one
another [27,40,41]. The ‘‘Durkheimian opinion dynamics model’’
proposed in the following can explain pluralistic clustering for the
case of continuously varying opinions, although it incorporates all
the features that have previously been found to undermine clustering:
(1) a fully connected influence network, (2) absence of bounded
confidence, (3) no negative influence, and (4) white opinion noise.
From a methodological viewpoint, our model builds on concepts
from statistical physics, namely the phenomenon of ‘‘nucleation’’
[45], illustrated by the formation of water droplets in supersaturated
vapor. However, by assuming adaptive noise, we move beyond
conventional nucleation models. The model also resembles
elements of Interacting Particle Systems [46] like the voter model
and the anti-voter model [47–50] which have been used to study
dynamics of discrete opinions (‘‘pro’’ and ‘‘contra’’). However, we
focus here on continuous opinions like the degree to which individuals
are in favor of or against a political party.
Computational simulation experiments reveal that, despite the
continuity of opinions in our model, it generates pluralism as an
intermediate phase between monoculture and individualism. When
the integrating forces are too strong, the model dynamics inevitably
implies monoculture, even when the individual opinions are initially
distributed at random. When the disintegrating forces prevail, the
result is what Durkheim called ‘‘anomie’’, a state of extreme
individualism without a social structure, even if there is perfect
consensusinthebeginning.Interestingly,thereisnosharptransition
between these two phases, when the relative strength of both forces
is changed. Instead, we observe an additional, intermediate regime,
where opinion clustering occurs, which is independent of the initial
condition. In this regime, adaptive noise entails robust pluralism
that is stabilized by the adaptability of cluster size. When clusters are
small, individualization tendencies are too weak to prohibit a fusion
of clusters. However, when clusters grow large, individualization
increases in strength, which triggers a splitting into smaller clusters
(‘‘fission’’). In this way, our model solves the cluster formation
problem of earlier models. While in BC models, white noise causes
either monoculture or fragmentation (Fig. 1C), in the Durkheimian
opinion dynamics model proposed here, it enables clustering.
Therefore, rather than endangering cluster formation, noise supports
it. In the following, we describe the model and identify conditions
under which pluralism can flourish.
Model
The model has been elaborated as an agent-based model [51]
addressing the opinion dynamics of interacting individuals. The
simulated population consists of N agents i, representing
individuals, each characterized by an opinion oi(t) at time t.
The numerical value for the opinion varies between a given
minimum and maximum value on a metric scale. We use the term
‘‘opinion’’ here, for consistency with the literature on social
influence models. However, oi(t) may also reflect behaviors,
beliefs, norms, customs or any other cardinal cultural attribute that
individuals consider relevant and that is changed by social
influence. The dynamics is modeled as a sequence of events.
Every event t the computer randomly picks an agent i and changes
the opinion oi(t) by the amount
Doi~
P N
j~1
j=i
(oj(t){oi(t))wij(t)
P N
j~1
j=i
wij(t)
zji(t): ð1Þ
The first term on the rhs of Eq. [1] models the integrating forces of
Durkheim’s theory. Technically, agents tend to adopt the weighted
average of the opinions oj(t) of all other members j of the
population. Implementing homophily, the social influence wij(t)
that agent j has on agent i is the stronger, the smaller their opinion
distance dij(t)~Doj(t){oi(t)D is. Formally, we assume
wij(t)~e
{dij(t)=A~e
{Doj(t){oi(t)D=A: ð2Þ
The parameter A represents the range of social influence of
agents. For small positive values of A, agents are very confident in
their current opinion and are mainly influenced by individuals
who hold very similar opinions, while markedly distinct opinions
have little impact. The higher A is, however, the more are agents
influenced by individuals with considerably different opinions
and the stronger are the integrating forces in our Durkheimian
theory.
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by a noise term ji(t). Specifically, the computer adds a normally
distributed random value ji(t) (‘‘white noise’’) to the first term on
the rhs of Eq. [1]. While we assume that the mean value of the
random variable ji(t) is zero, the standard deviation has been
specified as
hi(t)~s
X N
j~1
e
{dij(t): ð3Þ
The larger the standard deviation, the stronger are the
individualization tendencies of an agent. Following Durkheim’s
theory, equation [3] implements noise in an adaptive way:
Accordingly, an agent’s striving for individualization is weak, if
there are only a few others with similar opinions. Under such
conditions, there is no need to increase distinctiveness. However, if
many others hold a similar opinion, then individuals are more
motivated to differ from others.
By including the focal agent i in the sum of Eq. [3], we assume
that there is always some degree of opinion noise, even when agent
i holds a perfectly unique opinion. These fluctuations may have a
variety of reasons, such as misjudgments, trial-and-error behavior,
or the influence of exogenous factors on the individual opinion.
Furthermore, this assumption reflects Durkheim’s notion that the
seeking for uniqueness is a fundamental feature of human
personality, which cannot be suppressed completely [26,52].
We use the parameter s of Eq. [3] to vary the strength of the
disintegrating forces in society. The higher the value of s, the
higher is the standard deviation of the distribution, from which
ji(t) is drawn, and the stronger are the disintegrating forces.
Finally, to keep the opinions of the agents within the bounds of the
opinion scale, we set the value of ji(t) to zero, if the bounds of the
opinion space would be left otherwise.
Results
We have studied the Durkheimian opinion dynamics model
with extensive computer simulations, focusing on relatively small
populations (N~100), because in this case it is reasonable to
assume that all members may interact with each other. For bigger
populations one would have to take into account the topology of
the social interaction network as well. Such networks would most
likely consist of segregated components (‘‘communities’’), which
are not or only loosely connected with each other [12–15].
Existing social influence models can explain how under such
conditions each community develops its own shared opinion (see
Fig. 1A). However, according to these models opinion clustering is
only stable when there is no interaction between communities
[29,33], an assumption that appears not to be empirically correct in
an increasingly connected world. Therefore, we focus on a setting
for which the lack of connectedness is guaranteed to be excluded
as explanation of clustering and study model dynamics in relatively
small and complete interaction networks.
To illustrate the model dynamics, Fig. 2 shows three typical
simulation runs for different strengths s of disintegrating forces,
while the strength A~2 of the integrating force is kept constant. In
each run, all agents start with an opinion in the middle of the
opinion scale (oi(0)~0), i.e. conformity. This is an initial condition
for which the classical BC-model does not produce diversity.
Fig. 2A shows typical opinion trajectories for a population in
which the integrating forces are much stronger than the
disintegrating forces. Consequently, the population develops
Figure 2. Opinion trajectories of three representative simulation runs with 100 agents generated by the Durkheimian model. In all
three runs, the opinions are restricted to values between 2250 and 250, and all agents hold the same opinion initially (oi(0)~0 for all i). In all runs, we
assume the same social influence range A~2, but vary the strength s of the disintegrating force. (A) Monoculture, resulting in the case of a weak
disintegrating force (s~0:4). Agents do not hold perfectly identical opinions, but the variance is low. We studied dynamics over 10.000 iterations
(Each iteration consists of N simulation events t.). (B) Anomie (i.e. extreme individualism), generated by a very strong disintegrating force (s~6).
Agents spread over the complete opinion scale. The black line represents the time-dependent opinion of a single, randomly picked agent, showing
significant opinion changes over time, which is in contrast to the collective opinion formation dynamics found in the monocultural and pluralistic
cases (A) and (B). (C) For a moderate disintegrating force (s~1:2), the population quickly disintegrates into clusters. As long as these clusters are
small, they are metastable. However, clusters perform random walks and can merge (e.g. around iteration 5500). As the disintegrating force grows
with the size of a cluster, big clusters eventually split up into subclusters (e.g. around iteration 7000). The additional graph, in which each agent’s
opinion trajectory is represented by a solid black line, is an alternative visualization of the simulation run with s~1:2. It shows that the composition of
clusters persists over long time periods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000959.g002
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even though not all agents hold exactly the same opinion.
Triggered by the random influences ji(t), the average opinion
performs a characteristic random walk.
When the disintegrating force prevails, the pattern is strikingly
different. Fig. 2B shows that for large noise strengths s, the initial
consensus breaks up quickly, and the agents’ opinions are soon
scattered across the entire opinion space.
Simulation scenarios A and B are characteristic for what
Durkheim referred to as states of social cohesion and of anomie.
Interestingly, however, pluralism arises as a third state in which
several opinion clusters form and coexist. Fig. 2C shows a typical
simulation run, where the adaptive noise maintains pluralism
despite the antagonistic impacts of integrating and disintegrating
forces—in fact because of this. In the related region of the
parameter space, disintegrating forces prevent global consensus,
but the integrating forces are strong enough to also prevent the
population from extreme individualization. This is in pronounced
contrast to what we found for the BC-model with strong noise
(Fig. 1C). Instead, we obtain a number of coexisting, metastable
clusters of a characteristic, parameter-dependent size. Each cluster
consists of a relatively small number of agents, which keeps the
disintegrating forces in the cluster weak and allows clusters to
persist. (Remember that the tendency of individualization
according to Eq. [3] increases, when many individuals hold
similar opinions.) However, due to opinion drift, distinct clusters
may eventually merge. When this happens, the emergent cluster
becomes unstable and will eventually split up into smaller clusters,
because disintegrating forces increase in strength as a cluster
grows.
Strikingly, the state of diversity, in which several opinion clusters
can coexist, is not restricted to a narrow set of conditions under
which integrating and disintegrating forces are balanced exactly.
Fig. 3 demonstrates that opinion clusters exist in a significant area
of the parameter space, i.e. the clustering state establishes another
phase, which is to be distinguished from monoculture and from
anomie.
To generate Fig. 3, we conducted a simulation experiment in
which we varied the influence range A and the strength s of the
disintegrating force. For each parameter combination, we ran 100
replications and measured the average number of clusters that
were present after 250,000 iterations. To count the number of
clusters in a population, we ordered the N agents according to
their opinion. A cluster was defined as a set of agents in adjacent
positions such that each set member was separated from the
adjacent set members by a maximum of 5 scale points (=opinion
range/N). Fig. 3 shows that, for large social influence ranges A
and small noise strengths s, the average number of clusters is below
1.5, reflecting monoculture in the population. In the other
extreme, i.e. for a small influence range A and large noise
strengths s, the resulting distribution contains more than 31
clusters, a number of clusters that cannot be distinguished from
purely random distributions. Following Durkheim, we have
classified such cases as anomie, i.e. as the state of extreme
individualism. Between these two phases, there are numerous
parameter combinations, for which the number of clusters is
higher than 1.5 and clearly smaller than in the anomie phase. This
constitutes the clustering phase. Fig. 3 also shows that, for each
parameter combination, there is a small variance in the number of
clusters, which is due to a statistical equilibrium of occasional
fusion and fission processes of opinion clusters (see Fig. 2C).
The same results were found, when starting the computer
simulations with a uniform opinion distribution. This demon-
strates that the simulations were run long enough (250,000
Figure 3. Conditions of clustering, monoculture and Anomie. The figure shows the dependence of the average number of clusters in the
Durkheimian model on the strength s of the disintegrating force and the range A of social influence. To generate it, we conducted computer
simulations with N~100 agents, starting with initial consensus (oi(0)~0 for all i). We restricted opinions to values between 2250 and 250. We varied
the strength s of the disintegrating force between s~0:4 and s~8 in steps of 0.4. A varied between A~0:2 and A~4 in steps of 0.2. For each
parameter combination, we conducted 100 independent replications and assessed the average number of clusters formed after 250,000 iterations
(see z-axis and the color scale). The two transparent (gray) surfaces depict the inter-quartile range, which indicates a small variance in the number of
clusters (and also typical cluster sizes) for each parameter combination. The horizontal grids indicate the borders of the three phases, as defined by
us. An average cluster size below 1.5 indicates monoculture. Values between 1.5 and 31 reflect clustering. Finally, values above 31 correspond to
opinion distributions that cannot be distinguished from random ones and represent a state of anomie.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000959.g003
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is an attractor in the sense that the model generates clustering
independent of the initial distribution of opinions. In addition, we
performed additional statistical tests with the simulation outcomes
to make sure that the existence of clusters in our model indeed
indicates pluralism and not fragmentation, a state in which a
population consists of one big cluster and a number of isolated
agents (see Fig. 4). To illustrate, Fig. 4A plots the size of the biggest
cluster in the population versus the number of clusters (see the blue
areas). For comparison, the yellow area depicts the corresponding
distribution for randomly fragmented opinion distributions. The
figure shows that the distributions hardly overlap and that the
Durkheimian model generates clustering rather than fragmenta-
tion. In clear contrast, Fig. 4B reveals that the opinion
distributions generated by the noisy BC-model are fragmented
and not clustered. Finally, to exclude that results have been
influenced by floating point inaccuracies [53] we conducted
simulation experiments with the restriction that influence weights
wij(t) could not adopt values smaller than 10{9. All results could
be replicated.
Discussion
The phenomenon of self-organized clustering phenomena in
biological and social systems is widespread and important. With
the advent of mathematical and computer models for such
phenomena, there has been an increasing interest to study them
also in human populations. The work presented here focuses on
resolving the long-standing puzzle of opinion clustering.
The emergence and persistence of pluralism is a striking
phenomenon in a world in which social networks are highly
connected and social influence is an ever present force that reduces
differences between those who interact. We have developed a
formal theory of social influence that, besides anomie and
monoculture, shows a third, pluralistic phase characterized by
opinion clustering. It occurs, when all individuals interact with
each other and noise prevents the convergence to a single opinion,
despite homophily.
Our model does not assume negative influence, and it behaves
markedly different from bounded confidence models, in which
white opinion noise produces fragmentation rather than clustering.
Furthermore, our model does not rely on the problematic
assumptionofclassicalinfluencemodelsthat agentsareforevermore
cut-off from influence by members of distinct clusters. In order to
demonstrate this, we studied model predictions in a settingwhere all
members of the population interact with each other. However,
empirical research shows that opinion clustering tends to coincide
withclustered network structures [20] and spatial separation [18]. It
would therefore be natural to generalize the model in a way that it
also considers the structure of real social networks. Such a model is
obtained by replacing the values wij(t) by wij(t)aij, where aij are the
entries of the adjacency matrix (i.e. aij~1, if individuals i and j
interact, otherwise aij~0). Then, the resulting opinion clusters are
expected to have a broad range of different sizes, similar to what is
observed for the sizes of social groups.
Our model highlights the functional role that ‘‘noise’’ (random-
ness, fluctuations, or other sources of variability) plays for the
organization of social systems. It furthermore shows that the
combination of two mechanisms (deterministic integrating forces
and stochastic disintegrating forces) can give rise to new
phenomena. We also believe that our results are meaningful for
the analysis of the social integration of our societies. According to
Durkheim’s theory of the development of societies [26], traditional
human societies are characterized by ‘‘mechanical solidarity’’. In
these societies, individuals are strongly integrated in very homoge-
neous communities which exert strong influence on the behavior
andopinionsofindividuals.AccordingtoDurkheim,however,these
regulating social structures dissolve as societies turn modern. In
addition, Durkheim [26] and contemporary social thinkers [27]
argue that in modern and globalized societies individuals are
Figure 4. Comparison of the (A) Durkheimian model and (B) the noisy BC-model. Figures plot the size of the biggest cluster versus the
number of clusters and compare it to the case of random fragmentation in all simulation runs that resulted in more than one and less than 32
clusters. Fig. 4A is based on the simulation experiment with the Durkheimian model underlying Fig. 3. Fig. 4B is based on an experiment with the BC-
model [33] where we varied the bounded-confidence level E between 0.01 and 0.15 in steps of 0.02 and the noise level h between 5 and 50 in steps of
5. We conducted 100 replications per parameter combination and measured the number of clusters and the size of the biggest cluster after 250,000
iterations. White solid lines represent the average size of the biggest cluster. The dark blue area shows the respective interquartile range and the light
blue area the complete value range. For comparison, we generated randomly fragmented opinion distributions of N~100 agents where n agents hold
random opinions (N(0,50)) and the remaining N{n agents hold opinion oi~0 and form one big cluster. We varied the value of n between 0 and 100
in steps of 1 and generated 1000 distributions per condition. The average size of the biggest cluster of the resulting distributions is shown by the thin
yellow-black line. (The curve stops at 22, since this is the highest number of clusters generated.) The bold yellow-black lines represent the related
interquartile range. We find that the value range of the Durkheimian model (blue area) hardly overlaps with the interquartile range of the fragmented
distributions (yellow area). This demonstrates that the Durkheimian model shows clustering rather than fragmentation. In contrast, Fig. 4B illustrates
that the distributions of the noisy BC-model and the results for random fragmentation overlap.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000959.g004
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ualization [26]. As a consequence, the social forces which let
individuals follow societal norms may lose their power to limit
individual variation. Durkheim feared that the high diversity could
disintegrate societies as they modernize [26]. That is, extreme
individualization in modern societies may obstruct the social
structures that traditionally provided social support and guidance
to individuals.
Today, modern societies are highly diverse, but at the same time
they are far from a state of disintegration as foreseen by Durkheim.
He argued that this is possible if societies develop what he called
‘‘organic solidarity’’. In this state societies are highly diverse but at
the same time the division of labor creates a dense web of
dependencies which integrate individuals into society and generate
sufficient moral and social binding [26]. Strikingly, our formal
model of Durkheim’s theory revealed another possibility which
does not require additional integrating structures like the division
of labor: Besides monoculture and anomie, there is a third,
pluralistic clustering phase, in which individualization prevents
overall consensus, but at the same time, social influence can still
prevent extreme individualism. The interplay between integrating
and disintegrating forces leads to a plurality of opinions, while
metastable subgroups occur, within which individuals find a local
consensus. Individuals may identify with such subgroups and
develop long-lasting social relationships with similar others.
Therefore, they are not isolated and not without support or
guidance, in contrast to the state of disintegration that Durkheim
was worried about.
We have seen, however, that pluralism and cultural diversity
require an approximate balance between integrating and disinte-
grating forces. If this balance is disturbed, societies may drift
towards anomie or monoculture. It is, therefore, interesting to ask
how the current tendency of globalization will influence society
and cultural dynamics. The Internet, interregional migration, and
global tourism, for example, make it easy to get in contact with
members of distant and different cultures. Previous models [24,35]
suggest that this could affect cultural diversity in favor of a
monoculture. However, if the individual striving for uniqueness is
sufficiently strong, formation of diverse groups (a large variety of
international social communities) should be able to persist even in
a globalizing world. In view of the alternative futures, character-
ized by monoculture or pluralism, further theoretical, empirical,
and experimental research should be performed to expand our
knowledge of the mechanisms that will determine the future of
pluralistic societies.
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